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A SHIFT TOWARD PROTECTIONISM UNDER § 301
OF THE 1974 TRADE ACT: PROBLEMS OF
UNILATERAL TRADE RETALIATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States government often portrays itself as the
strongest advocate of free trade principles, condemning the protective trade policies of foreign governments." However, due to the
enormous trade deficit experienced by the United States in the past
decade, 2 its free trade policy has changed significantly.' A sharp contrast has emerged between the United States' tough talk on free
trade and the protectionist actions of Congress and the Administration. This change of policy is most obviously reflected in the controversial Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988
Trade Act), 4 and especially in the amendment of the unilateral trade
retaliation measure of § 301 of the 1974 Trade Act.5
The 1988 Trade Act introduced various measures intended to
revitalize the stagnating competitive power of the United States in
the international economic arena.6 According to authors Bello and
Holmer,7 the most controversial provision in the 1988 Trade Act is
1. See, e.g., JOINT

REPORT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL

IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (1990).

2. See infra note 64.
3. See infra notes 63-102 and accompanying text.
4. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (enacted August 23, 1988). Over 300 trade bills were introduced in Congress in 1985.
See Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter Bello & Holmer, The
Heart of the 1988 Trade Act] (noting that several omnibus trade bills were discussed during
the sessions between 1985 and 1988 before the 1988 Trade Act was finally enacted).
5. See infra notes 11, 13.
6. See Freedenberg, The 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill: Issues and Perspectives, 1989
B.Y.U. L. REv. 365, 365-70 (stating that significant changes were made, for example, to: the
legal mechanism for addressing the unfair trade practices; the protection of intellectual property; the protection of domestic industry by the use of a § 201 escape clause, anti-dumping
and countervailing duty laws and export control regulations). For further discussion of each
area where the 1988 Trade Act provided significant changes, see id.
7. Judith Hippler Bello was the General Counsel to the Office of the United States
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the amendment of § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.8 Section 301, 9
the unilateral trade retaliation provision, was originally introduced
as a part of the Trade Act of 1974 to fight against "unfair"1 0 foreign

trade practices.11 However, the 1988 Trade Act was characterized as
a "fundamental departure from the direction U.S. trade policy has
taken since the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974. ' 12 Furthermore, the nature of the new § 301 is significantly different
from the
13
§ 301 that was in place prior to the 1988 amendments.
The new § 301 proposals attracted a great deal of attention
from United States' trading partners during the Congressional debate. 14 The European Community (EC) 15 and Japan severely criticized the introduction of one amendment within the new proposals,
referred to as "Super 301," ' 1 which requires mandatory investigaTrade Representative from 1988 to 1989, and prior to.that position, she was Chairperson of
the inter-agency Section 301 Committee (1986-1988). See Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the
1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 1. Alan F. Homer was the Deputy United States Trade
Representative at the time the 1988 Trade Act was enacted and, prior to that, was the General
Counsel to that Office (1985 to 1987). See id.
8. Id. at 2 (stating that at the heart of the bills before Congress was § 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 which was "the main U.S. trade law designed to pry open foreign markets to U.S.
investment and exports of goods and services, and to achieve adequate and effective protection
abroad for intellectual property rights.").
9. In this Note, the United States' retaliation scheme against foreign trade practices,
provided for in § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and which remained in force until the amendments were made in 1988, is referred to as "§ 301" unless otherwise indicated.
10. The terms "unfair" and "unfair practices" are broadly used in this Note to designate all acts, policies and practices that are actionable under § 301.
11. See The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, § 301, 88 Stat. 2041
(1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1979)). The predecessor of § 301 was introduced in
1962 in a more moderate form. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, ch. 6, § 252, 76 Stat. 879
(authorizing the President, for the first time, to take appropriate and feasible steps against
unjustifiable foreign import restrictions) (repealed 1974).
12. Freedenberg, supra note 6, at 365.
13. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 1301-02, 102 Stat. 1164 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988)) [hereinafter the "new
§ 301"]; see infra notes 103-39 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in the new
§ 301).
14. See, e.g., Wright, The 1988 Trade Act - Refinement or Major Change to U.S.
Trade Laws? A View from the European Community, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 533, 540-41 (reiterating the longstanding position of the European Community against § 301 because of its
doubtful legality under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)); Nanto, Japan's Response to the Omnibus Trade Act, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 517, 521 (discussing Japan's
concern over being a targeted country under the new § 301).
15. The European Community is a regional governmental international organization established in 1958. See T. HARTLEY. THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 3
(1981). Current member countries include France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Id. at 3-5.
16. This amendment to § 301 has been characterized as the "Super 301" provision.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss1/8

2

Nara: A Shift Toward Protectionism Under §301 of the 1974 Trade Act: Pr

1990]

SECTION 301

tions by the United States Trade Representative (USTR)' 7 of certain unfair trade practices of foreign countries.1 8 These countries

criticized Super 301 on the grounds that it is contrary to the multilateral negotiation system provided for under the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." 9
Although it remains to be seen how Super 301 will be implemented, the statute's unilateral retaliation provision violates accepted public international law principles. Specifically, Super 301
ventures beyond traditional bases of prescriptive20 and enforcement 2'
jurisdiction. 22 The new § 301, which incorporates Super 301, empowers the USTR to determine whether a foreign trade policy is "unfair" under a standard set by the United States. 23 Section 301 reFreedenburg, supra note 6, at 366; Bradley, Amendments to Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THE NEW TRADE LAW: OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988, at 140 (1988). For a discussion of Super 301, see infra notes 127-39
and accompanying text.
17. The Office of the United States Trade Representative was established under 19
U.S.C. § 2171 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) within the Executive Office of the President. The
USTR has primary responsibility for the conduct of international trade negotiations. See, e.g.,
Holmer, The Office of the Trade Representative: Recent Legal Developments, 20 INT'L LAW.
1351, 1351-59 (1986) (outlining the major legal issues that developed in 1985-86 regarding
trade incentives and legislative issues).
18. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(b) (1988) (regarding the initiation of USTR investigations);
see also infra notes 128-39 (explaining that under Super 301 the USTR is required to initiate
an investigation on its own motion against countries which were identified as priority countries
by the Report of National Trade Estimate).
19. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAT (1969)
(explaining the origin, history, and obligations of GAIT member countries). The current text
of GATT, as of the end of 1986, is contained in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GAT Basic
Documents 1-105 (K. Simmonds & B. Hill eds. 1988) [hereinafter GATT]. For an explanation of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, see infra notes 154-85 and accompanying
text. During the GATT Council meetings held in June 1989 in Geneva, the application of
Super 301 was attacked by its member countries. U.S. Trade Policy Attacked (June 21, 1989)
(Nexis, United Press Int'l.).
20. Prescriptive jurisdiction is a state act "usually in legislative form, whereby the State
asserts the right to characterize conduct as delictual," i.e. wrong. Bowett, Jurisdiction:Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources, 1982 BIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1; see
infra note 224.
21. Enforcement jurisdiction is an act "designed to enforce the prescriptive jurisdiction"
either by administrative or judicial action. Id.
22. Unless there is jurisdiction to prescribe, a country cannot have jurisdiction to enforce. See id. (discussing the basic principles for bases of jurisdiction); see also RESTATEMENT
(TmRw) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 comment a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(TiuR)D)] (noting that the limitations on a state's authority to adjudicate differ from the "limitations on a state's authority to enforce its law through administrative, executive or police
action.").
23. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988) (providing discretionary power to the USTR to
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quires the USTR to evaluate the economic policy of foreign
countries. However, without a legitimate basis of prescriptive jurisdiction, the USTR's determination against allegedly "unfair" foreign
trade practices should not be enforced 4 because such interference
with the national 2economic
policy of a foreign country violates public
5
international law.
This Note first analyzes, in Section II, the purposes and procedures of the original § 301 and the subsequent amendments and
changes made by the new § 301, which embodies Super 301.26 In
Section III, this Note examines the new § 301 under the framework
of GATT and fundamental principles of public international law.2
This section suggests that the unilateral retaliation mechanism of
§ 301 violates the dispute settlement provisions of GATT and the
spirit of the multilateralism upon which GATT is based, 28 and that
the new § 301 violates the principles of prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction under public international law. 29 In particular, the authority conferred to the USTR violates the territorial principle of
prescriptive jurisdiction because the United States cannot legitimately exercise its jurisdiction when a sovereign state has concurrent
jurisdiction.30 Although the new § 301 finds its basis of jurisdiction
in effects produced within United States territory, 31 this section violates the rules regarding concurrent jurisdiction expressed in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.3 2 Particularly problematic is the Super 301 mechanism, which authorizes the USTR to
identify priority countries conducting unfair trade practices. 3 The
USTR's authority clearly violates the principle of reasonableness
which limits prescriptive jurisdiction when another state has concurrent jurisdiction. 4 This Note concludes that because § 301 violates
public international law principles, Super 301 should be repealed.35
enforce United States' rights and to respond to unfair trade practices).
24. See Bowett, supra note 20, at 19 (questioning the extent to which the United States
may impose its economic or political views on foreign countries).
25. See infra notes 220-83 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 36-139 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 140-283 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 140-219 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 220-83 and accompanying text.
30. See id.
31. See infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 243-83 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 251-83 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
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II.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNILATERAL RETALIATION
PROVISION

A.

Section 301 Prior to 1988

1. Purposes and Functions
The unilateral retaliation provision of § 301 was originally enacted in 19746 and was amended in 1979, 3 7 198438 and 1988. 3 9
Prior to the 1988 amendments, § 301 provided a retaliation mechanism against "unfair" foreign trade practices similar to the current
statute but more flexible. 0 The section's primary purpose was to authorize the President, under two situations, to take retaliatory action
against certain foreign acts, policies or practices.4 1 First, § 301 authorized the President to take action when a foreign country violated
a trade agreement, and consequently that country denied the United
States the benefits of the trade agreement in question.4 2 Second, the
President could take action against "unjustifiable, unreasonable or
discriminatory" foreign practices which burdened or restricted
United States commerce.4 3
When the President determined that a foreign governmental
practice was actionable under § 301 because it was either unreasonable or violated a trade agreement, he was authorized to take "all
appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce such
rights.' ' 44 These broad powers enabled the President to unilaterally
36.

See supra note 11.

37. Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. IX, § 901.
38. Pub. L. No. 98-573, tit. III, § 304.
39. See supra note 13.
40. See infra notes 41-62; Cf. infra notes 104-39 and accompanying text (discussing the
significant changes made in the new § 301). Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1988) with 19

U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (1982 & Supjp. V 1987).
41.

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended and codified prior to the 1988

amendments in 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) provided that:
If the President determines that action by the United States is appropriate

-

(A) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agreement; or
(B) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country or instrumentality

that (i) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the
United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts
United States commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.
42. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
43. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
44.

Id. § 2411 (a)(1). The possible actions that the President could take under the au-
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retaliate against foreign trade practices which hindered trade expansion. The § 301 retaliation mechanism was designed to protect "the
nation's right to take political action in pursuit of national economic
interests, by negotiating international agreements" against the prescribed acts, policies and practices of foreign governments. 4" The
provision was considered extremely political because the ultimate
power to retaliate was conferred upon the President alone. Thus, the
President weighed the merits of § 301 retaliation against other factors of international relations. The nature of § 301 began to change
in 1985 when the United States Government started actively using
§ 301 to retaliate against foreign trade practices."
2.

The Procedure of § 301 Investigations

Prior to 1988, any interested party could file a petition requesting a § 301 investigation,4 7 and the USTR had forty-five days to
determine whether to initiate such an investigation. 4" The President
could also self-initiate a § 301 investigation on his own motion where
no petition was filed by another party.4 9 In addition, the USTR was
thority conferred by § 301, prior to 1988, included the suspension of benefits of trade agreement concessions and the imposition of duties. Id. § 2411 (b). Section 2411 (b) provided, prior
to the 1988 amendments, that:
Upon making a determination described in subsection (a) of this section, the President, in addition to taking action referred to in such subsection, may (1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming,
benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the
foreign country or instrumentality involved;
(2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he determines appropriate.
Id.
45. Note, Defining Unreasonablenessin International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, 96 YALE LJ. 1122, 1127 (1987) (authored by Patricia I. Hansen) (emphasis in
original).
46. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (empowering the President to take
retaliatory action against certain foreign acts, policies or practices). In response to pressure
from Congress, the President, in collaboration with the USTR, has initiated numerous § 301
investigations since 1985. See Bello & Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures,and Developments, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633 (1986) [hereinafter
Bello & Holmer, Section 301 ] (illustrating the recent applications of § 301 and explaining the
increased resort to the section); Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra
note 4, at 12 (noting Senate approval of USTR's advice that § 301 retaliation should be
mandatory but not compulsory).
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also Bello & Holmer,
Section 301, supra note 46, at 645-57 (describing pre-filing consultation by the petitioner with
the Office of the USTR and the actual filing procedure).
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.3 (1989).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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also authorized, by the 1984 amendment, to self-initiate § 301 inves-

tigations.50 If an investigation was initiated, the USTR usually requested a consultation with the foreign country or multilateral organization, such as the EC, concerning the issues raised in the

petition or the issues which the USTR deemed important. 51 The consultation procedures included bilateral negotiations with the foreign

government as well as GATT dispute settlement procedures provided
for in GATT Articles XXII and XXIII 2 The majority of § 301
investigations were terminated without Presidential retaliation be-

cause bilateral or multilateral negotiations usually prompted improvements in the allegedly "unfair" practices. 3 Thus, the § 301
proceeding usually encouraged negotiations with foreign governments and often led to mutually acceptable trade dispute resolutions,

rather than Presidential action. 4
If the negotiations failed, however, the President could take "all
appropriate and feasible action.15 5 The threat of action enhanced the
USTR's negotiating posture by pressuring foreign governments to
reach an acceptable solution to trade disputes. Thus, § 301 was
designed to give the USTR leverage in trade negotiations. 6
If the negotiations did not lead to a settlement, the President
had to determine whether the questionable trade practice was action50. See id. § 2412(c)(1) (authorizing the USTR to initiate a § 301 investigation when it
is necessary to advise the President concerning the exercise of the President's authority under
§ 301).
51. See id. § 2413(a). This section provided that: "On the date an affirmative determination is made [to initiate a § 301 investigation], the Trade Representative ...shall request
consultations with the foreign country or instrumentality concerned regarding issues raised in
the petition or the determination of the Trade Representative" made through a self-initiated
investigation. Id.
52. See infra notes 157-85 and accompanying text (discussing GATT Articles XXII and
XXIII).
53. See OFFIcE OF THE U.S. TRDE REPRESENTATIVE, SECTON 301 TABLE OF CASES
(December 14, 1989) [hereinafter TABLE OF CAsES] (on file at Hofstra Law Review). According to the TABLE OF CASES, 68 cases were initiated between 1974 and 1988 prior to the enactment of the 1988 Trade Act on August 23, 1988. Id. at 1-34. Half of these cases were terminated pursuant to successful bilateral or multilateral negotiations which improved the allegedly
unfair trade practice whil five cases were terminated because the claim under § 301 was not
justified or the petition was withdrawn. Id.
54. Holmer & Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the InternationalTrading System?, 23 INT'L LAw. 523, 527 (1989) (stating that the objective of § 301 was never
retaliation; "rather, the credible threat of retaliation was intended to serve as a stick that, in
combination with the carrot of an open U.S. market, could pry open foreign markets and thus
further liberalize trade.").
55. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1982 & Supp V 1987) (authorizing the President to take
action against certain foreign trade practices). This section is reprinted at supra note 41.
56. Bello & Holmer, Section 301, supra note 46, at 646 n.77.
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able before taking retaliatory action.5 7 In the few instances where
the President hesitantly determined that § 301 could be invoked, he
was very reluctant to proceed to retaliation because of international
political considerations. Section 301 retaliation was used only in
extreme cases5 9 and was once described as "the H-bomb of trade
policy."' Despite the legal problems presented by the GATT system
and principles of international law,"1 the President's self-restraint in
taking § 301 action kept the trading partners' criticism less visible
under the old § 301.62
3. Section 301 Retaliatory Actions Taken Prior to the 1988
Trade Act
a. Prior to 1985.- Although Congress enacted § 301 in 1974,
the United States Government did not invoke § 301 investigations
very frequently until 1984,13 shortly after the United States trade
deficit dramatically increased.6 4 The President took retaliatory action only twice prior to 1985.5
The first case involved hides exported from Argentina and was
57. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); supra note 41.
58. Note, Foreign Industrial Targeting: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 As a
Remedy, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 515-16 (1985) (authored by Gregory T. Nojeim) (noting that
the President was reluctant to take action under § 301 because of international political considerations, which included: the negative impact that retaliation might have on third countries,
the hesitation to subject generally friendly countries to § 301 action, and limitations under
international trade agreements).
59. See infra notes 63-102 and accompanying text.
60. Comparing Major Trade Bills: Hearings on S.490, S.636 & H.R. 3 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987) (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade Representative).
61. For a discussion of these problems, see infra notes 140-283 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 63-102 and accompanying text (discussing the small number of investigations conducted prior to 1988).
63. See TABLE OF CASES, supra note 53, at 1-34 (showing that while 47 cases were
initiated during the eleven year period from 1974 to 1984, 21 cases were initiated during the
three year period from 1985 until the 1988 amendments were enacted).
64. The trade deficit of the United States in 1984 was $108 billion, almost twice as
much as the figure of the previous year, and the trade deficit continued to increase annually.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 1989, at 786 [hereinafter 1989 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The Bureau of the Census
gives the following figures for merchandise trade balance (in billions of dollars):
1970
2.7
1983
- 57.5
1975
9.1
1984
-107.9
1980
-24.2
1985
-132.1

1981

-27.6

1986

-152.7

1982

-31.8

1987

-152.1

Id.
65. See TABLE OF CASE, supra note 53.
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initiated based on a petition filed by the National Tanner's Council. 6 The petition alleged that Argentina breached a United StatesArgentina hides agreement of 1979, which required Argentina to
adopt an ad valorem tax 67 on exports of hides to replace its embargo
on exports and, in exchange, required the United States to reduce its
duty on such products. 68 This case was, therefore, a violation-of-atrade-agreement case.69 In 1982, during the course of the § 301 investigation, President Reagan terminated the Agreement and retaliated by imposing a 5 % ad valorem tariff on leather imported from
Argentina." °
The second § 301 retaliation case involved an allegedly "unreasonable" trade practice by Canada. 1 In 1978, various American television licensees filed a petition alleging that certain provisions of the
Canadian Income Tax Act were unreasonable. These provisions denied Canadian taxpayers deductions if they purchased advertising
time from American, rather than Canadian, broadcasters.7 2 President Carter determined that the Canadian practice was unfair and
declared that the appropriate response was to enact mirror legislation in the United States.7 3 This determination was carried out on
October 30, 1984 as part of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 4
b. Between 1985 and 1988.- Since 1985 when the United
States' trade deficit began to increase rapidly, 75 the President and
the USTR have become more active in using § 301 investigations
and § 301 actions to fight against "unfair" foreign trade practices. 76
66. Argentina Hides, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,353 (1981) (initiation).
67. Ad valorem is a tax imposed on the value of property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
48 (5th ed. 1979).
68. Proclamation No. 4993, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,625 (1982).
69. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the President's
proclamation was not specifically issued pursuant to § 301 of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1982). See Proclamation No. 4993, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,625 (1982) (stating that action was
taken pursuant to Sections 125 and 604 of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2135, 2483 (1982)).
Nonetheless, the President took retaliatory action as a result of the § 301 investigation. Id.
70. Proclamation No. 4993, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,626. (1982).
71. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that the President could take
action against unreasonable foreign practices).
72. Canada Broadcasting, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,617 (1978) (initiation).
73. President's Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 45 Fed.
Reg. 51,173 (1980).
74. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 232, 98 Stat. 2991 (1984).

75. See 1989
76.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,

supra note 64, at 786.

Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supranote 4, at 10 n.51 (noting

that beginning in 1985 President Reagan began to use § 301 more often than he had in the
past).
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President Reagan took retaliatory action in five cases between 1985
and 1988.7 Two of these cases were initiated prior to 1985, but the
§ 301 retaliation was taken after 1985."8 The three other actions
were taken prior to the enactment of the 1988 Trade Act. These
cases are briefly discussed below.
In the EC Citrus Tariff Preferences for Certain Mediterranean
Countries case, a petition was filed in 1976 alleging that the EC's
preferential tariffs had an adverse effect on the United States' citrus
export to the EC. 9 Nine years later in 1985, the President determined that the EC's practice was "unreasonable." 80 The President
retaliated by imposing up to a 40% ad valorem duty on certain
pasta from the EC. 1l In the case of Non-Rubber Footwear Import
Restrictions in Japan,82 the President decided to increase duties on
83
certain imports of leather and footwear from Japan.
The EC Enlargement case was self-initiated by the USTR.8'
77. See TABLE OF CASES, supra note 53, at 3-4, 15, 19-20, 25-26, 28. Section 301 actions were taken in the following five cases: EC Citrus Tariff Preferences for Certain Mediterranean Countries (Docket No. 301-11), id. at 3-4; Japan Non-Rubber Footwear Import Restrictions (Docket No. 301-36), id. at 15; Japan Semiconductors (Docket No. 301-48), id. at
19-20; EC Enlargement (Docket No. 301-54), id. at 25-26; and Canada Softwood Lumber
(Docket No. 301-58), id. at 28.
78. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
79. EC Citrus Tariff Preferences for Certain Mediterranean Countries, 41 Fed. Reg
52,567 (1976). The petition was filed by the Florida Citrus Commission on November 12,
1976 alleging that the EC's preferential tariffs on orange and grapefruit juices and fresh citrus
fruits from certain Mediterranean countries had an adverse effect on U.S. citrus exports to the
EC. Id.
80. Proclamation No. 5354, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985).
81. Id. This dispute grew into the so-called "pasta war" between the EC and the United
States. The EC's export subsidies on pasta were subject to another § 301 investigation which
was later initiated in 1981 (Docket No. 301-25). See EC Pasta Export Subsidies, 46 Fed. Reg.
59,675 (1981) (petition).
82. Brazil Non-rubber Footwear Import Restrictions, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (1982). The
petition was filed by the Footwear Industries of America, Inc. on October 25, 1982, and alleged that import restrictions on non-rubber footwear denied access to the market, were inconsistent with GATT, and were unreasonable. Id.
83. Proclamation No. 5448, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,435 (1986).
84. Not only has the President utilized § 301 retaliation more often since 1985, the
USTR has frequently used its authority to self-initiate § 301 investigations since the grant of
such authority by the 1984 amendments to § 301. After the USTR was given the authority to
self-initiate § 301 investigations, eight cases were self-initiated in 1985 and 1986 either by the
President or the USTR. These cases are: Brazil Informatics (Docket No. 301-49); Japan Tobacco Products (Docket No. 301-50); Korea Insurance (Docket No. 301-51); Korea Intellectual Property Rights (Docket No. 301-52); EC Enlargement (Docket No. 301-54); Taiwan
Customs Valuation (Docket No. 301-56); Taiwan Beer, wine and Tobacco (Docket No. 30157); Canada Softwood Lumber (Docket No. 301-58). TABLE OF CASES, supra note 53, at 2123, 25-26, 28.
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That case involved quantitative restrictions on oilseeds and grains in
Portugal and the withdrawal of tariff concessions on corn and sorghum in Spain. 5 The President decided to impose import quotas on
certain imports from the EC by suspending the tariff concession
under GATT. However, this case clearly illustrates that § 301 retaliation may not provide the ultimate solution to a trade dispute.
After the United States imposed the import quota, the United States
and the EC continued to negotiate, and the two parties agreed to
reach definitive settlement by December 31, 1986.87
The negotiation, however, became prolonged and another formal
investigation under § 301 was initiated on January 5, 1988.88 Based
upon consultations between the EC and the United States, a GATT
panel was established on May 19, 1989.89 As a result of substantial
progress under GATT, the United States government delayed implementation of actions under § 301.90 Although § 301 worked to trigger negotiations with the EC, mere unilateral retaliation in the form
of an import quota could not achieve the objective of terminating the
EC subsidies. Thus, in this case, § 301 retaliation was not as effective as the GATT dispute settlement procedures to improve market
access.
Another § 301 action was taken against Canada for its violation
of an agreement with the United States to impose a 15 % ad
valorem tax on softwood lumber products exported from Canada. 91
On December 30, 1986, President Reagan decided to impose an additional duty of 15 % ad valorem on imports of Canadian softwood
lumber products."2 Then, on May 26, 1987, the Canadian Government passed legislation imposing a 15 % ad valorem tax on exports
of softwood lumber products to the United States; the case was then
resolved.93
85. EC Enlargement, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,294 (1986) (determination).
86. Proclamation No. 5478, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,296 (1986).
87. Bello & Holmer, Section 301, supra note 46, at 653-54.
88. See EC Oilseeds, 53 Fed. Reg. 984 (1988) (initiation).
89. See EC Oilseeds, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,123 (1989) (determination to delay implementation of any action).
90. Id.
91. Proclamation No. 5595, 52 Fed. Reg. 229 (1987) (Canada Softwood Lumber case).
This action was taken on December 30, 1986, however, on the same day the U.S. Department
of Commerce agreed to terminate a countervailing duty investigation after Canada agreed to
impose such a tax and by January 8, 1987, the Secretary determined that Canada had begun
to collect this tax. See TABLE oF CAses, supra note 53, at 28 (Docket No. 301-58).
92. Proclamation No. 5595, 52 Fed. Reg. 229 (1987).
93. See TABLE OF CAsEs, supra note 53, at 28.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:229

The final example of § 301 action was the Japan Semiconductor
case, which attracted a great deal of attention.9 4 The case was initiated in June 1985 upon a petition filed by the Semiconductor Industry Association.9 5 The United States and Japan reached an agreement after intensive bilateral consultation, and the Arrangement
concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products was signed on September 2, 1986.96 This Arrangement provided for enhanced free trade in
semiconductors based on market priciples and the competitive positions of the semiconductor industries in the two countries.97 President Reagan alleged that the Japanese Government had failed to
implement the Arrangement and, on April 17, 1987, he imposed
100% ad valorem custom duties on power hand tools, 18 and 19inch color televisions, and low performance 16-bit desktop computers
exported from Japan.9
The 100% duty amounted to a virtual import ban on these
products and stirred tremendous attention in Japan. 99 The duty imposed led Japan to immediately correct the noncompliance with the
Arrangement of 1986.100 In response, the USTR suspended most of
the retaliatory measures within less than seven months after the
100% duty was imposed. 10 1 This case illustrates how § 301 retaliation can work effectively when a foreign country relies heavily on
exports to the United States. °2
94.

See Chira, Tokyo Sees Violation of Rules, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1987, § I, at 31,

col. 6.
95. See Japan Semiconductors, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (1985) (initiation).
96. See Japan Semiconductors, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986) (determination); TABLE OF
CAsEs, supra note 53, at 19-20.
97. Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,275 (1987) (notice of hearing). The two

governments signed the agreement, named the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement on
September 2, 1986, in which the government of Japan committed:
(1) To impress upon Japanese semiconductor producers and users the need to aggressively take advantage of increased market access opportunities in Japan for for-

eign-based semiconductor firms; and
(2) to provide further support for expanded sales of foreign-produced semiconduc-

tors in Japan through establishment of a sales assistance organization and promotion of stable long-term relationships between Japanese purchasers and foreignbased semiconductor producers.
Id.
98. Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,419 (1987) (determination).
99. Chira, supra note 94, at col. 6.
100. See Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,693 (1987) (suspension of some

sanctions).
101.

Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (1987) (suspension of some sanctions).

102. This is true of the trade relationship between the United States and Japan. A study
conducted by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) showed that the
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B.

The New § 301103

1. Introduction of the "Mandatory" Retaliation Requirement
The most significant change made to § 301 by the 1988 Trade

Act is the requirement of mandatory retaliation for violation-oftrade-agreement cases.104 The 1988 Act was enacted to "pry open

foreign markets to U.S. investment and exports of goods and services. 10°5 Therefore, Congress intended that § 301 retaliation be
used solely for trade purposes and not be influenced by international
politics.106 Section 301 had to be fundamentally altered to serve this
purpose, which Congress achieved by providing for mandatory ac-

tion. 107 The President's discretionary power was taken away and the
Japanese economy's reliance on exports to the United States is far greater than the U.S. reliance on its exports to Japan. Taibei Izon Kukkiri: Moshi Nichibei-Boueki ga Tomattara
[Clear Reliance on the United States: If the Trade Between Japan and United States
Stopped], Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 29, 1989, at 9, col. 1. The MITI's analysis showed that if
trading between the two countries stopped, the Japanese economy would suffer a 5% loss,
whereas the United States economy would be affected by only 0.6%. Id. The study seems to
support the vulnerable position of the Japanese Government as the vulnerable party in trade
negotiations. Id.
103. The amendment of § 301 has been discussed in Congress since 1985, Bello &
Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 1, and many extreme amendments
that never materialized in the 1988 Trade Act were introduced. For example, Representative
Richard A. Gephardt introduced an amendment which authorized the USTR to take immediate steps to remove trade barriers in a country with excessive and unwarranted trade surpluses
and to reduce such surpluses. Id. at 30. After a very lengthy debate in the House Ways and
Means Committee and on the House floor, Congress adopted the provision entitled Identification of Trade Liberalization Priorities, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat. 1176-79 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988)). See Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act,
supra note 4, at 35-37.
104. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
105. Bello & Holmer, The Heart .of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 2.
106. See id. at 3 & n.10; 134 CONG. REc. H5532 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement
of Rep. Richardson) (stating that §301 retaliation was "intended to enhance USTR's position
as the lead trade agency and to make it less likely that trade retaliation would be waived
because of foreign policy, defense, or other considerations.").
107. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988). This section, entitled "Mandatory action," provides that:
(1) If the United States Trade Representative determines under section 2414(a)(1)
of this title that(A) the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are being
denied; or
(B) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country (i) violates, or is inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce;
the Trade Representative shall take action authorized in subsection
(c) of this section, subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President regarding any such action, and shall take all other appropriate
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USTR was compelled to retaliate when an act, policy, or practice of
a foreign country violated a trade agreement with the United
States. 0 8
Although the form of retaliation remains discretionary, 10 9 the
amount of retaliation must be equivalent in value to the burden or
restriction imposed on United States commerce.11 0 The USTR,
therefore, must first determine the monetary loss to the United
States caused by the "unfair" trade practice of a foreign government. The USTR must then decide how to impose an equivalent
burden on that foreign country."'
2.

Transfer of Authority from the President to the USTR

The new § 301 transfers authority from the President to the
USTR," 2 whereby the USTR must now determine: 1) whether unfair trade practices are actionable under § 301 and 2) whether retaliation is appropriate under the circumstances. 13 The USTR was
vested with these new powers to reduce the likelihood that trade benefits for a foreign country would be exchanged for nontrade benefits
to the United States." 4 The significance of the USTR's mandatory
authority is still unclear but some commentators argue that there
will be little difference because the USTR continues to "serve[] at
the pleasure of the President, and therefore is unlikely to take acand feasible action within the power of the President that the President may direct the Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act,
policy, or practice.
Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. H.R. CONF. REP.No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 558, reprintedin 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmEN. NEws 1547, 1591.

111. See supra notes 63-102 (discussing past examples of retaliatory actions in which ad
valorem tax was imposed on foreign commerce as a result of foreign trade practices deemed to
burden or restrict U.S. commerce).
112. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)-(b) (1988). Both the power to determine whether foreign
practices are actionable under § 301 and the power to take action pursuant to such determinations are under the authority of the USTR. Id. "The President [does] not retain separate
authority to'take action on his own motion, but may direct the USTR to take section 301
action." H.R. CONF. REP.No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 551, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADNIN. NEws 1547, 1584.
113. Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 8 (describing
how the final decision was made to transfer § 301 authority to the USTR).
114. Id. at 3 & n.10 (indicating that trade benefits might have been waived because of
foreign policy, defense, or other nontrade considerations and that this issue was subject to an
extensive debate in Congress).
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tions of which the President disapproves. 11 5
However, Congress can impose more pressure on the USTR
than on the President; 116 therefore, it will be more difficult for the
USTR to avoid taking retaliatory action. The USTR will not have
the liberty, which the President had under the previous § 301,217 to
refrain from taking retaliatory action when it determines that the
alleged "unfair" practice is actionable under § 301. Therefore, the
transfer of authority to the USTR will result in less flexible decision
making under the new § 301. Coupled with mandatory retaliation,
the new § 301 is less flexible and more provocative in the eyes of
foreign governments."'
The Administration, represented by the then Trade Representative, Ambassador Yeutter, was opposed to any amendment of § 301
because the USTR believed that the previous § 301 provided an adequate retaliatory mechanism against "unfair" foreign trade practices.""9 Since its introduction in 1974, § 301 has been criticized by
foreign countries because its unilateral character is contrary to the
GATT system of multilateralism 20 and arguably violates principles
of public international law.' 21 Although a number of cases were initiated, the President decided not to take action in many cases because
of other political considerations. 22 The USTR, therefore, opposed
115.

Id. at 10.

116. 134 CONG. Rc H5536, H5545 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (indicating that Congressmen think that "it would be easier for Congress to browbeat [the U.S. Trade Representative] with [their] parochial concerns than it would be the President."). This seems to be true
because the current Trade Representative, Carla Hills, will be more vulnerable, than President
Bush, to Congressional pressure.
117. E.g., TABLE OF CASES, supra note 53, at 21-22. In the case of Brazil Informatics,
51 Fed. Reg. 35,993 (1986), the President determined, on October 6, 1986, that Brazil's informatics policy was unreasonable. However, he suspended the investigation because he found
that Brazil's policy had improved in these areas. Brazil Informatics, 52 Fed. Reg. 1,619
(1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 24,971 (1987). The investigation was finally terminated on October 6,
1989. Brazil Informatics, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,880 (1989).
118. Immediately after the 1988 Trade Act was passed, the EC delegate to GATT expressed the EC's serious concern about the new § 301 because "it reduces the president's scope
for discretionary action." New U.S. Trade Law is Protectionist, European Community Tells
GATT Council, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1303 (Sept. 28, 1988).
119. See Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 3-4, 1214, 31-32 (discussing the Administration's opposition to every amendment proposed by
Congress).
120. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 14, at 539 (expressing the EC's longstanding opposition to § 301, which the EC deems contrary to GATT).
121. See, e.g., Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices:
The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461, 52628 (discussing the inconsistency between the original § 301 and GATT).
122. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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removing the President's discretion to refrain from taking action.123
The USTR recognized that the President needed to retain
discretion
124
so that he could negotiate from a broader viewpoint.
In addition, the United States Administration opposed the
amendments in light of the reaction of foreign governments. The Administration opposed the transfer of authority to the USTR because
trading partners might perceive the transfer as evidence of a declining interest in trade by the United States.12 5 Opponents of the
mandatory retaliation scheme felt that the provision "could easily do
more harm than good by provoking nationalistic reactions in other
countries and thereby reducing a foreign government's political ability and willingness to negotiate a satisfactory settlement. ' 126
3. Super 301:
1 27
Priorities

Identification of

Trade

Liberalization

The 1988 Trade Act introduced a new mechanism called Super
301128 to apply § 301 to certain foreign unfair practices identified by
the Report of National Trade Estimate (NTE). 29 Under this provision, the USTR is required to identify United States trade liberalization priorities, including priority practices and countries, that will be
subject to Super 301 investigation 30 and trade negotiations.1 31 Al123. Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 4.
124. See id.; see also Brown, U.S. Competitiveness in World Markets, 18 INT'L L. &
POL 1075, 1079 (1986) (stating that there are many factors affecting the trade situation;
therefore, it is necessary to take all factors into consideration rather than resorting to trade
protectionism).
125. Bello & Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 4, at 4.
126. Id. at 13.
127. Other than the requirement of "mandatory" action discussed above, see supra
notes 103-11, the Trade Act of 1988 had two significant amendments. One is Super 301 discussed in this section, and the other is Special 301 concerning intellectual property protection,
See 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988); see also Bradley, supra note 16, at 131, 142.
128. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat. 1176-79 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2420
(1988)); cf supra note 103 (referring to Congressional debate over various similar amendments). Although this provision is not referred to as Super 301 in the statute itself, commentators do refer to it as such. See supra note 16.
129. See 19 U.S.C § 2241 (1988) (requiring the USTR to "identify and analyze acts,
policies or practices of each foreign country which constitute significant barriers to ...United
States exports of goods or services.").
130. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a) (1988). This section provides:
(1) By no later than the date that is 30 days after the date in calendar year 1989,
and also the date in calendar year 1990, on which the report required under section
2241(b) of this title is submitted to the appropriate Congressional committees, the
Trade Representative shall identify United States trade liberalization priorities, including (A) priority practices, including barriers and trade distorting practices, the
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though the self-initiated investigation was possible under § 301 prior

to the 1988 amendments, 3 2 the trade liberalization priority required
the USTR, in 1989 and again in 1990, to initiate investigations

against all major trade barriers and market distorting practices. 133
The first Super 301 decision was made on May 26, 1989.1" In
this decision, the USTR identified six practices of three countries as
priority practices requiring Super 301 investigation and negotiation. 135 Many countries, beside those identified in the report, criticized this action by the United States. 3 6 Since an annual report by
elimination of which are likely to have the most significant potential to increase United States exports, either directly or through the establishment of
a beneficial precedent;
(B) priority foreign countries that, on the basis of such report, satisfy the
criteria in paragraph (2);
(C) estimate the total amount by which United States exports of goods and
services to each foreign country identified under subparagraph (B) would
have increased during the preceding calendar year if the priority practices of
such country identified under subparagraph (A) did not exist.
Id.
131. See id. § 2420(c). This section provides that:
(1) In the consultations with a priority foreign country ... that the Trade Representative is required to request ....

Id.

the Trade Representative shall seek to negoti-

ate an agreement which provides for(A) the elimination of, or compensation for, the priority practices identified
under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section by no later than the close of the 3year period beginning on the date on which such investigation is initiated,
and
(B) the reduction of such practices over a 3-year period with the expectation
that United States exports to the foreign country will, as a result, increase
incrementally during each year within such 3-year period.

132. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
133. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988); supra note 130.
134. Trade Liberalization Priorities, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,438-39 (1989) (identification of
such priorities under Super 301).
135. Id. The identified practices were:
(i) Quantitative import restrictions by Brazil;
(ii) Exclusionary government procurement by Japan of satellites;
(iii) Exclusionary government procurement by Japan of supercomputers;
(iv) Technical barriers to trade in import of forest products in Japan;
(v) India's trade-related investment measures;
(vi) India's barriers to trade in services.
Id. at 24,439.
136. See U.S. Trade Policy Attacked, supra note 19 (referring to the GATT Council
meetings of June 1989 and stating that the countries which criticized the retaliatory measures
included Yugoslavia, Peru, Pakistan, Egypt, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Korea,
Romania, Nicaragua, Hungary, Australia, Israel and Czechoslovakia). The Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also criticized the protectionism reflected in
Super 301 during the Council Meetings in May and June 1989. Nihon wo Nerai-UchishitaBei
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the USTR is required under Super 301,137 the USTR entered vigorous negotiations with the governments of Japan, India and Brazil to
achieve substantial accomplishment within twelve months.138 In June
and the investi1990, the investigation against Japan was suspended
13 9
gations against Brazil and India were terminated.
III. SECTION 301 VIOLATES GATT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW

A.

Violation of GATT

1. Fundamental Principles of the GATT System

The post-World War II international economy has been regulated by the basic principles established at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.14 ° These principles were reflected in the efforts to

establish GATT, which provided a "framework for concrete negotiations on tariffs and other trade matters"' 4' in order to protect the
"value of the tariff concessions.''141 The basic premise behind establishing international cooperation in the post-war world economy was
the belief among national leaders that it is "essential to prevent the
Super 301 Jo [U.S. Super 301 Specifically Targeting Japan], SEKM SHUHO [World Weekly]
10, 15 (June 27, 1989).
137. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(d) (1988).
138. See, e.g., Farnsworth, Japanese Pledge to Lower Barriersto Trade with U.S., N.Y.
Times, Apr. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1; Funabashi & Takanarita, Kozokyogi Satshuhokoku [Final
Report on the Structural Impediments Initiative], Asahi Shimbun, Mar. 29, 1990, at 1, col. 1;
Funabashi & Takanarita, Bet, Kozou Shoheki Kaizen he Yokyu: 200 Komoku Kosu Telan
[U.S. Demands the Improvement of Structural Impediments: Proposes Over 200 Items], Asahi
Shimbun, Mar. 23, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
139. See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,693 (1990) (reporting the progress under Super 301 investigations); Brazil Import Licensing, 55 Fed. Reg. 22,876 (1990) (terminating the investigation
against the Brazil's import licensing practice after the Brazilian Government issued a resolution to eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports); Japan Satellites, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,761-64
(1990) (suspending three investigations involving satellites, supercomputers and forest products against Japan after both governments reached an agreement on a comprehensive package
of measures which will greatly improve market access for the Unites States exporters); India
Investment, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,765 (1990) (terminating the investigation against India in view of
Uruguay Round GATT negotiations despite the determination by the USTR that India's practices on foreign investors were unreasonable).
140. See J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 2.2, at 36-41 (noting that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were established at this conference); see also Pehle, The
Bretton Woods Institutions, 55 YALE LJ.1127 (1946) (discussing the establishment of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the so-called World Bank, and the principles of the operation of these international
economic organizations).
141. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 1,3, at 12.
142. Id. § 1.7, at 29.
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pursuit of self-interested national regulation of international trade in

a manner that harms other nations and in a manner that, when combined with retaliatory actions, results in a sharp and chaotic restric-

tion in the over-all level of international trade.'1 43 The purposes of
establishing GATT were: (1) to limit tariffs through the Most-Favored-Nation clause;14 4 (2) to protect the value of the tariff conces45
sions against "nullification" by various non-tariff import barriers;
(3) to establish a "'code of trade conduct' to channel protectionist
devices away from certain types of barriers; 1 46 and (4) to provide
"consultation procedures and joint action to carry out the basic pur-

'
poses of the agreement.'

47

Contrary to these principles of international cooperation, the

President was given, under the 1974 Trade Act, "broad authority to
retaliate against both 'unreasonable' as well as 'unjustifiable' import
restrictions which affect U.S. commerce.' 48 This authority was
transferred to the USTR by the new § 301.149 Additionally, the
USTR is required to identify priority practices and priority countries
143. Id. § 1.3, at 9 (stating that such national restrictions include: "the imposition of
quantitative restriction on imports in the 1920's and 1930's, high tariff laws such as the United
States Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1931, the manipulation of currency exchange rates, and the
constant changing of import regulations without adequate notice to traders.").
144. Id. § 1.7, at 29; see also GATT, supra note 19, art. I, para. 1, at 1-2. This section
of GATT provides that:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation .. ., any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 19, art. I, para. 1, at 1-2.
145. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 1.7, at 29; see also GATT, supra note 19, art. II, at
3-6 (entitled "Schedules of Concessions").
146. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 1.7, at 29; see also GATT, supra note 19, art. III, at
7-9 (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation); id. art. VI, at 12-15 (Antidumping and Countervailing Duties); id. art. VII, at 15-18 (Valuation for Customs Purposes);
id. art. VIII, at 18-19 (Fees and Formalities Connected with Importation and Exportation); id.
art. IX, at 19-20 (Marks of Origin); id. art. X, at 21-22 (Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations); id. art. XI, at 22-24 (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions);
id. art. XIII, at 29-32 (Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions); id.
art. XV, at 33-36 (Exchange Arrangements); id. art. XVI, at 36-37 (Subsidies); id. art. XVII,
at 37-39 (State Trading Enterprises).
147. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 1.7, at 29; see also GATT, supra note 19, arts. XXII,
XXIII, at 55-57.
148. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 163, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEws 7186, 7301 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 36-46 (discussing the purposes and functions of § 301).
149. See supra notes 112-26 (discussing the transfer of authority from the President to
the USTR).
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based on statistical data from the NTE Report.1 50 Once priority
countries have been identified, the USTR must negotiate with the
priority countries to eliminate the priority practices which burden
United States commerce. 151 The statute allows the USTR to unilat-

erally pursue the national interest of the United States, and this was
precisely what GATT was designed to prevent. 5 2 Super 301, therefore, clearly contradicts the principles of multilateralism underlying
153

GATT

a. Purposes of the GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Under Article XXIII.- Section 301 specifically violates the dispute
settlement provisions of GATT. 154 The original GATT dispute settlement clauses were based on a proposal drafted by the United States
in the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO).1 55
The plan to establish ITO was never carried out; however, GATT,
which was suppose to be a provisional measure until the establishment of ITO, has continued to exist to date. 156
The goals of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII are: (1) to establish a "dispute-settlement procedure, stressing the general obligation
to consult on any matter relating to GATT; '157 (2) to assure compliance with GATT obligations; 5 8 and (3) to "provide a means for en150. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a) (1988). This section is reprinted at supra note 130.
151. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(c)(1) (1988). This section is reprinted at supra note 131.
The language of Super 301 does not allow the USTR to exercise discretion, but requires it to
pursue the § 301 procedure against any priority countries or practices. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2420(b)-(c)(1) (1988). Congress made clear that the USTR is required to initiate a § 301
investigation of all acts identified under Super 301. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 578, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1611. Furthermore, the USTR is expected to use all information, in addition to the National Trade
Estimate (NTE) report which is relied upon to make priority identifications, to identify the
barriers in foreign trade practices, and the USTR is also authorized to initiate investigations of
these practices. Id.
152. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of GATT).
153. See Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its UtilitiesAgainst Alleged
Unfair Trade Practicesby the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U.L. Rv. 492, 515-16 (1987)
(authored by K. Blake Thatcher).
154. See GATT, supra note 19, arts. XXII, XXIII, at 55-57.
155. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 8.3, at 166-69; see Bronz, The International Trade
Organization Charter, 62 HARV. L. Rav. 1089, 1123-24 (1949) (discussing the fundamental
principles of the Charter of ITO and outlining the development of these principles into the
important rules governing international trade including the enforcement mechanism against
nullification and impairment by one member country of benefits another country was entitled
to receive under the Charter).
156. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 2.5, at 50.
157. Id. § 8.3, at 169.
158. Id.
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suring continued reciprocity and balance of concessions." 1591 The dispute settlement procedure provided in GATT intends to solve

problems through negotiation and consultation "rather than 'punishment,' or imposing a 'sanction,' or obtaining 'compensation.' "160
Thus, the mechanism of § 301 is a fundamental departure from basic GATT objectives. The USTR may withdraw any benefits to a
country, which are provided under a trade agreement, when it determines that a trade practice of that country is unfair under the new
§ 301.161 When a prohibitive duty is imposed or mirror legislation is
enacted, such action may be tantamount to a punishment or a sanction.16 2 Moreover, the duty may be compensatory since the degree of

retaliation must be equivalent to the burden imposed on United
States commerce.163
b. Function of GATT Article XXIII. 1 64 - Article XXIII applies

when any benefit of GATT is being nullified or impaired by: "(a) the
failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under
this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting party
of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
159. Id. at 170.
160. Id. § 8.5, at 184.
161. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A) (1988).
162. See supra notes 63-102. The imposition of a 100 percent duty on unrelated goods,
as was the case in Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,419 (1987), is clearly a sanction for
the industry affected by the § 301 action.
163. H.R. CONF. RaP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 558, reprintedin 1988 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1547, 1591 (stating that the amount of retaliation must be equivalent
in value to the burden imposed on U.S. commerce).
164. Both Articles XXII and XXIII are dispute settlement provisions. See GATT, supra
note 19, arts. XXII, XXIII, at 55-57. Article XXII provides for consultation between contracting parties, id. art. XXII, at 55, and under Article XXIII, CONTRACTING PARTIES
may consult with any contracting party for a possible solution of the matter, id. art. XXIII, at
55-56. Article XXIII purports to solve the nullification and impairment of benefits to any
contracting party and further provides the CONTRACTING PARTIES with authority to investigate and make recommendations. Id. art. XXIII, at 56. Articles XXII and XXIII are not
necessarily connected and each can stand alone. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 178.
Therefore, "procedures under Article XXII are not a prerequisite to procedures under Article
XXIII." Id. However, the circumstances which Super 301 considers to retaliate are similar to
nullification and impairment under Article XXIII. See Hudec, supra note 121, at 515-22
(comparing the concept of nullification and impairment under GATT Article XXIII with the
requirement to take actions under § 301). Thus, only Article XXIII will be considered in this
section.
In the language of GATT documents, when the term CONTRACTING PARTIES is
capitalized, it refers to the members of GATT acting jointly to make a GATT decision as a
group. See GATT, supra note 19, art. XXV, at 62. The term "contracting parties" in lower
case designates individual members acting on behalf of their country. See J. JACKSON, supra
note 19, § 5.1, at 119. This distinction has been used in official GATT records and literature.
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Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation . .. ."165
Thus, Article XXIII can be invoked in a fairly broad range of circumstances. In addition, it may be invoked without any violations of
GATT necessary."' For instance, general global economic circumstances could present an occasion for requesting process under Arti1 7
cle XXIII.'
In order to invoke Article XXIII, the complainant contracting
party must first consult with the other contracting party or parties
about the problem, and then make written representations or propos165. GATT, supra note 19, art. XXIII, para. 1, at 55-56. This Article of GATT provides that:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly
or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under
this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view
to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposais to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.
Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the
representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph l(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter
so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting
parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties,
with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary.
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions
or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in
the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or
other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not
later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from
this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him.
Id. art. XXIII, at 55-57.
166. GATT, supra note 19, art. XXIII, para. 1(c), at 56 (allowing "any other situation"
to be the reason of alleging that any benefit under the GATT system is being nullified and
impaired).
167. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 180.
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als to such parties.168 If the consultation fails, GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES begin to participate in the dispute settlement."6 9 First, the complaining contracting party requests the
initiation of the Article XXIII procedure which can be a simple request to put the matter on the agenda of the Council Meeting 11 0
Second, a panel is appointed to hear the arguments of each party. 17 1
Finally, the panel makes a recommendation in its Report to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES.Y2 Usually the panel recommends
that the offending practices cease if it finds that one nation actually
violated GATT obligations.17 3 Throughout this procedure, efforts are
made to achieve a conciliation between the disputing parties.17 4
c. Past Practicesof GATT Article XXIII.- Despite the dissatisfaction expressed by Congress with the achievements that GATT
has produced, 7 5 the United States succeeded in obtaining favorable
findings through GATT negotiations. For example, the United States
obtained a resolution regarding the disputes over Japan's import
quota on agricultural products. 6 On February 2, 1989, after two
years of GATT negotiations, Japan finally accepted the GATT
panel's report that Japan was imposing unfair import duties on
twelve agricultural products, including dried vegetables, groundnuts
and prepared bovine meat.177 Following the GATT finding, the
United States was able to bilaterally negotiate with Japan, which
agreed to end its import quotas by April 1, 1990.178
In another case, the United States filed a complaint with GATT
168. See GATT, supra note 19, art. XXIII, para. 2, at 56-57 (requiring that written
proposals be made to a contracting party before the formal dispute settlement procedures of
Article XXIII, paragraph 2, can be invoked); see also J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 178
(noting that paragraph 1 of Article XXIII "provides another 'consultation' procedure which, in
some ways, duplicates that of Article XXII.").
169. GATT, supra note 19, art. XXIII, para. 2, at 56-57. For a discussion of the distinction between the terms CONTRACTING PARTIES and "contracting parties," see supra
note 164.
170. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 8.4, at 176.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Hudec, supra note 121, at 510-15 (discussing the arguments made by GATT

critics).
176. See infra notes 177-82.
177. Japan Accepts Panel Report on Agricultural Import Restrictionsat GATT Council Meeting, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 133 (Feb. 3, 1988).
178. Japan Agrees to Comply With GATT Ruling in Dispute Over 11 Processed Food
Products, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1057-58 (July 27, 1988).
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against Japan's import quota on beef and citrus products after bilateral negotiations failed. 7 9 While the United States government was
pursuing the GATT resolution, Florida Citrus Mutual, an American
interest group, filed a petition under the old § 301. The investigation
of Japan Citrus was initiated in May, 1988.180 The ultimate resolution was obtained through bilateral negotiations between the. United
States and Japan."" l The § 301 investigation was then terminated.8 2
While proponents of § 301 trade retaliation would praise the value of
§ 301 in this case because it expedited the GATT negotiation and
helped achieve the desired result, the negotiations were in fact disrupted by the initiation of § 301 investigations, and the bargaining
8 3
balance was tipped by § 301 unilateralism.
Some United States trade practices that have been subject to
GATT dispute settlement have resulted in adverse findings.' 8 4 The
United States has tried to resist these negative findings but has been
forced to accept the panel reports under international pressure. 88
2. Necessity of Compliance with GATT
a. International Law is Part of the Law Governing the United

States.- Under United States legal principles, it cannot automatically be concluded that a federal statute which violates international
179. U.S. to Seek GATT Action Against Japan'sBeef, Citrus Policies After Talks Fall,
Yeutter Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 491 (Apr. 6, 1988).
180.

See TABLE

OF

CASES, supra note 53, at 34 (Docket No. 301-66).

181. Id.
182. Japan Citrus,.53 Fed. Reg. 25,714 (1988) (termination).
183. Foreign governments were obviously not satisfied with the results achieved by these
methods. Consequently, some § 301 cases resurfaced a few years later because of unsatisfactory implementation by the foreign government, even though an agreement had been reached
under the GATT negotiation.
184. See, e.g., GATT Panel Rules U.S. Sugar Quotas Illegal, Urges U.S. to Revamp
System, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 767 (June 14, 1989); GATT Council Finding of U.S.
Sugar Quota Inconsistency Accepted by U.S., Hills Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 837
(June 28, 1989).
185. Section 337 of 1930 Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, is another weapon that the
United States used to combat foreign unfair trade practices. The United States failed on several occassions to adopt the GATT panel's finding that § 337 violates Article III of GATT
which requires national treatment. See, e.g., GATT Council Agrees that Dispute Settlement
Should Be Revised for Emergency Situations, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 634 (May 17, 1989)
(U.S. Criticized On Section 337); Canada to Seek Compensation From U.S. Under GATT for
Earnings Lost to Superfund Surtax, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 478 (Apr. 19, 1989) (Section
337 Under Review); Leaked GATT Panel Ruling Against U.S. Patent Infringement Laws
Surprises USTR Officials, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1645 (Dec. 21, 1988). However, the
United States finally accepted the panel report on November 7, 1989. Bel Kanzel-Ho Gatto
han [U.S. Tariff Act Found to Be in Violation of GATT], Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 8, 1989, at
1, col. 4.
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law is invalid.'" 6 Under the United States Constitution, treaties are
the supreme law of the land."' Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized customary international law as United
States law since the beginning of this century. 18 8 Therefore, "where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations."' 189 In addition, when there is a federal statute, it
must be interpreted consistently with the principles of international
law unless there is explicit evidence to the contrary.190
Although the legislative history accompanying § 301 is silent on
whether the statute explicitly was intended to supersede the principles of GATT, such an intention can fairly be inferred from the
grant of unilateral retaliatory power to the President, and later, to
the USTR.' 91
Where there is an obvious conflict between a federal statute and
international law, the courts have held that federal law supersedes. 92 Federal law should not supersede GATT, however, because
it is not in the United States' long-term interest to contravene
GATT principles by a municipal law like § 301. There have been
cases where the GATT panel held in favor of the United States,
finding that a foreign country violated GATT, and the offending
country ceased from the unfair practice based on the panel's
93
finding.'
Section 301 was created because Congress was not satisfied with
186. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
187. US. CONST. art VI, cl.2.
188. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting The Paquete
Habana).
189. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
190. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925) (stating that "unless it unmistakably appears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of
international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to be in conformity with it."); see
also RESTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 22, §§ 114, 402 comment i (1987). But see Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting

that "international law must give way when it conflicts with or is superceded by a federal
statute or treaty.") (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1334 (2d Cir. 1972)).
191. See supra notes 41-43, 112-13 and accompanying text.
192. Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp at 1178 (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also RESTATEMENT (TiRD),
supra note 22, § 115.
193. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text (giving examples of GATT negotiated settlements).
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the way GATT protected tariff concessions against "unfair" trade
practices.1 94 Nevertheless, the United States has been using the
GATT dispute settlement procedure constantly, and has achieved
the desired results in some cases. 195 Moreover, the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism has been used more actively in recent years
than ever before. 96 Under such circumstances, it is difficult to justify the reasons for legislating the new § 301, including Super 301,
which are in direct conflict with GATT principles.
The government has been using the GATT dispute settlement
procedure in a manner contrary to its fundamental principles because contracting parties are threatened with § 301 retaliation while
negotiating with the United States. Fair negotiation between sovereign states is difficult to achieve under such a threat. 19 7 It is contrary
to the GATT principle of reciprocity to enter the negotiation with
the leverage power given by § 301.198 The direct consultations with a
trading partner under GATT, therefore, should be distinguished
from the request for GATT consultation as a part of § 301 procedures, which includes identification under Super 301. The United
States Government should not arbitrarily decide when to resort to
the GATT dispute settlement mechanism while ignoring GATT's
fundamental principles by imposing unilateral trade retaliation.
Although one can argue that GATT is merely a "general agreement" which does not have binding force like other formal treaties,
during the course of GATT's 40 year history, many contracting parties have substantially complied with its provisions. 99 Therefore,
even if GATT is not recognized as a formal treaty under Article VI
194. See Hudec, supra note 121, at 510-15.
195. See supra notes 175-82; see also Hudec, supra note 121, at 513 (noting that several successes in GATT cases occurred from 1969 to 1973).
196. Record Number of GATT Investigations Shows Reliance On Arbitration, GATT
Official Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1432 (Oct. 26, 1988).
197. The Japanese government refused to enter negotiations pursuant to Super 301 iden-

tification while the United States "brandished the threat of unilateral sanctions." Sanger, Negotiations Are Rejected by Japanese, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, at 31, col. 1. The Indian

Government criticized the identification as being "totally unjustified, irrational and unfair."
Crossette, India Assails U.S. on Trade Action, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, at 31, col. 1. The

governments identified under Super 301, therefore, find it difficult to internally explain to domestic interests why they must accept the undue pressure exerted by the United States Government during trade negotiations.
198. See supra notes 1f40-63 and accompanying text.
199. See K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
335 (1970) (explaining that although GATT is merely a multilateral agreement, and not an
organization, it has nevertheless been very successful over the years, due in part to creative

institutional arrangements).
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of the United States Constitution, the United States should comply
with the fundamental principles of GATT that have developed into
customary international law over time. 20 0 The existence of customary
international law is evidenced by "the general practice of States and
the acceptance of the general practice as law,"2 0° the latter of which
is referred to as opinio juris.20 2 The GATT principles, particularly
the most-favored-nation clause of Article I, have been the norm of
international trade. 20 3 In fact, international economic law has developed around GATT.2 0 4 Ninety-seven countries participate as contracting parties in GATT. 20 5 Thus, it is fair to say that at least the
basic principles of GATT have evolved into customary international
law. Section 301, therefore, arguably violates customary international law, which the Supreme Court has determined binds the
20 6
United States.
b. Law of Treaties Argument.- The consultation mechanism of
Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 20 7 provides dispute settlement
procedures when contracting parties208 encounter matters relating to
GATT. 20 The disputes which § 301 has attempted to solve since
1974 squarely fall into the category -of problems GATT addresses in
Article XXIII. 210 When a treaty containing a substantive obligation
provides a dispute settlement provision, it arguably excludes the
right to rely upon other methods. 211 As a signatory of GATT, the
United States should use GATT's dispute settlement procedure
rather than resorting to unilateral retaliation as outlined in the new
§ 301 .212 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea200. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COuRS [COLLECTED COURSES OF
THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 25, 57 (1971) (stating that "[tireaties that
do not purport to be declaratory of customary international law at the time that they enter into
force may nevertheless with the passage of time pass into customary international law.").
201. Hickey, Custom and Land-Based Pollution of the High Seas, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 409, 413 (1978).
202. Id. at 417.
203. J. SWEENEY, C. OUVER & N.

LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

1139

(3d ed. 1988).

204.
205.
206.
207.

See J. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 26-30 (1990).
Id. at 81.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.

208.

For a definition of "contracting parties," see supra note 164.

209. GATT, supra note 19, arts. XXII, XXIII, at 55-57.
210. See supra notes 154-85 and accompanying text.
211. J. JACKSON, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 163-64.
212.

19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)-(c) (1988).
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ties213 codifies the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, one of the most
important principles of public international law.214 The Article requires that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith." 2115 According to the
Article's legislative history, "the principle of good faith is a legal
principle which
forms an integral part of the rule pacta sunt
' '216
servanda.
Past practice shows that the United States is willing to impose
extremely high discriminatory duties under § 301.217 Although,
strictly speaking, GATT is not a treaty, the United States violated
the standard of good faith by enacting Super 301 because Super 301
clearly opposes the fundamental GATT most-favored-nation
clause.21 8 Furthermore, according to the interpretation of the USTR,
violations of GATT itself are subject to violation-of-trade-agreement
cases under § 301.219 Therefore, § 301 clearly ignores the dispute
settlement mechanism contained in GATT Articles XXII and XXIII
in cases where the United States' rights under GATT are affected by
another country's allegedly "unfair" practices.
B. Section 301 Violates Public InternationalLimits of State
Jurisdiction
1. Necessity of InternationalLaw Analysis
Not only does § 301 violate GATT, it also violates fundamental
international law governing state jurisdiction. Section 301's primary
purpose is to enforce the rights of the United States in international
trade. 220 Enforcing § 301 very often requires the foreign country
subject to the statute to alter its trade policy. When that occurs, the
United States is, thus, exercising enforcement jurisdiction to change
213. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
214. See I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 83 (2d ed.
1984).
215. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339.
216. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 214, at 84.
217. See supra notes 66-102 and accompanying text; infra note 218.
218. For example, in the Japan Semiconductors case, the United States violated the
most-favored-nation clause of Article I of GATT by imposing a one hundred percent tariff on
certain products originating in Japan. See GATT, supra note 19, art. I, para. 1, at 1-2; Japan
Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,419 (1987) (determination).
219. Bello & Holmer, Section 301, supra note 46, at 635.
220. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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extraterritorial economic activities.221 Under public international
law, a country must have prescriptive jurisdiction to enforce its juris-

diction over extraterritorial activities.222 To enforce § 301 actions,

the United States must have jurisdiction to prescribe § 301. Without
legitimate prescriptive jurisdiction, the USTR ambiguously imposes
what it believes is appropriate trade policy on foreign
22 3
governments.
221. Enforcement jurisdiction can be observed in the following § 301 cases: EC Citrus
Tariff Preferences for Certain Mediterranean Countries (Docket No. 301-11), see TABLE OF
CASES, supra note 53, at 3-4 (requiring the change of EC's export policy); Canada Border
Broadcasting (Docket No. 301-15), see id. at 7 (requiring a change in Canadian tax policy);
Japan Semiconductors (Docket No. 301-48), see id. at 19-20 (requiring the change of the
Japanese government's procurement policy).
222. Bowett, supra note 20, at 1; RESTATEMENT (TknRD), supra note 22, § 431(1).
223. In order to take mandatory action, the USTR must find that the alleged foreign
practice denies benefits to the United States under any trade agreement, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988), or is "unjustifiable," id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). Under the statute, an
"unjustifiable" practice is one in violation of the international legal rights of the United States,
such as denial of national or most-favored-nation treatment. Id. § 2411(d)(4). Because the
mandatory action is taken by application of trade agreements, the dispute is likely to involve
interpretation of the trade agreement in question. It is questionable whether the USTR has the
appropriate authority to interpret the agreement. For example, the interpretation of the GATT
agreement is delegated to CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII. In such a case,
the interpretive function should appropriately be given to the dispute settlement provision of
the trade agreement. Since the USTR is a party directly involved in the dispute, a fair and
impartial outcome cannot be guaranteed.
The "unreasonable" practice cases under which the USTR is authorized to take discretionary action are more troublesome. The USTR is authorized to take discretionary action
when a foreign trade practice is either "unreasonable" or "discriminatory." Id. § 2411(b). The
statute provides a lengthy list of practices which are considered to be "unreasonable" and
actionable under Super 301, but basically anything that the USTR finds "unfair and inequitable" is unreasonable. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(A). The new § 301 provides an extensive list of practices which the United States considers "unreasonable." Id. § 2411(d)(3). Among others, the
practice of export targeting is explicitly considered to be "unreasonable." Although a targeting
policy which amounts to subsidies prohibited under Article XVI of GATT would be in violation of GATT and consequently "unreasonable," export targeting is generally accepted under
GATT as a legitimate exercise of sovereign power in economic policy. See Note, supra note
58, at 489-92.
Another area focused on by the new § 301 is the area of workers' rights. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii) (1988). It is considered "unreasonable" for a foreign country to be engaged in a persistent pattern of conduct that denies workers the rights of association or of
collective bargaining. Id. The practices subject to Super 301 action also include forced or
compulsory labor, failure to provide a minimum age for the employment of children, or failure
to provide standards for minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of
workers. Id. The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to apply these provisions to countries whose economies had not reached a level to consider these factors. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 569, reprintedin 1988 CODE CONG. & AD~mN.
Naws 1547, 1602. From the viewpoint of foreign governments, it is unpredictable when the
USTR will consider that collective bargaining rights should be granted to the workers of that
country. However, workers' rights are a matter for the sovereign state to decide. Although the
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2. JurisdictionalBasis of § 301
a. Jurisdiction Based on the Effects Doctrine.-

Unless the

United States has legitimate prescriptive jurisdiction, it cannot enforce the new § 301, including Super 301 priority identification.

24

The language of the new § 301 does not explicitly provide for prescriptive jurisdiction. However, jurisdiction is inferred through the
"Effects Doctrine. 225
The USTR may take mandatory action if the Trade Representative finds that "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country ...
violates, ... or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under,

any trade agreement. '226 Similarly, before it takes a discretionary
action, the USTR must find that "an act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or reconcern is legitimate, the United States Government should not interfere with the labor policy
of foreign countries. The International Labor Organization (ILO), whose constitution has been
adopted by most countries, can police labor standards in each country. See I. BROwNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATONAL LAW 568 (4th ed. 1990); 1985 U.N.Y.B. 1278-82, U.N.
Sales No. 8811 (discussing ILO activities). Furthermore, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, openedfor signatureDec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, provided for the rights of workers listed in Super 301, although the United States has not ratified
this Covenant.
It is difficult for foreign governments to know when the new § 301 will be applied to its
own trade policies and when their practices may be identified as a priority practice under
Super 301. Even the GATT panel in a dispute settlement tends to refrain from making such a
determination because it believes that the organization should not second-guess the economic
policy of a sovereign state. See Hudec, supra note 121, at 502. There are almost always internally justifiable reasons for the foreign practices which appear to be "unreasonable" to the
United States.
224. RESTATBMENT (TmRD),supra note 22, § 401 comment a. Professor Bowett summarizes the character of jurisdiction as follows:
Jurisdiction is a manifestation of State sovereignty. It has been defined as "the capacity of a State under international law to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law."
There is, of course, a necessary distinction to be drawn between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction. The former embraces those acts by a State,
usually in legislative form, whereby the State asserts the right to characterize conduct as delictual. Examples would be the enactment of criminal, civil, commercial
codes, or regulations governing tax or currency transactions. The latter embraces
acts designed to enforce the prescriptive jurisdiction, either by way of administrative
action such as arrest or seizure or by way of judicial action through the courts or
even administrative agencies of a State. The relationship between the two kinds of
jurisdiction is reasonably clear. There can be no enforcement jurisdiction unless
there is prescriptive jurisdiction; yet there may be a prescriptive jurisdiction without
the possibility of an enforcement jurisdiction, as, for example, where the accused is
outside the territory of the prescribing State and not amenable to extradition. Thus,
jurisdiction hinges, fundamentally, on the power to prescribe. ...
Bowett, supra note 20, at 1 (citations omitted).
225. See infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
226. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988) (emphasis added).
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stricts United States commerce."22 The USTR is, thus, required to
find effects of foreign trade practices within the territory of the

United States; i.e., the denial of benefits and a burden or restriction
on United States commerce. Both the United States judiciary 228 and

international law 229 acknowledge that effects within a territory
caused by actions outside the territory are sufficient to confer legiti-

mate prescriptive
jurisdiction.23 0 This is known as the "Effects
231
Doctrine.
b. Development of the Effects Doctrine.- The Effects Doctrine, first formulated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
2 32 enabled the United States to apply its antitrust laws to an
(Alcoa),
anticompetitive agreement made outside the territory of the United
States. The Doctrine grants jurisdiction even though the individuals
are not subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States.2 3 Departing from the traditional application of objective territorial principle jurisdiction,23 4 the Alcoa Effects Doctrine required that in order
for the United States to exercise jurisdiction, the acts involved must
have: (1) been clearly unlawful, had they been performed within the
227. Id. § 2411(b)(1) (emphasis added).
228. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge
Learned Hand formulated the Effect Doctrine in applying the antitrust law of the United
States to "the conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it." Id. at 443.
Judge Hand stated that "it is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." Id.; see also REsTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 22, § 402 (explaining that "[s]ubject to
§ 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ...conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.").
229. Bowett, supra note 20, at 7; see The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (holding that Turkey could try a French seaman for acts committed in
international waters where a collision that occurred killed a Turkish citizen).
230. Under international law, the bases for jurisdiction to prescribe are found in (1) the
territorial principle, (2) the nationality (or personality) principle, (3) the protective principle,
and (4) the universality principle. Bowett, supra note 20, at 4-14.
231. See, e.g., Norton, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities
Laws, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575, 579-82 (1979); Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial
Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. Rav. 350, 361-64 (1983);
Note, Predictabilityand Comity: Toward Common Principlesof ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,
98 HARv.L. REv. 1310, 1313 (1985).
232. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see sources cited supra note 231.
233. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (holding that Congress intended to impose liability under
the Sherman Act to conduct outside the United States' personal jurisdiction as long as such
conduct has consequences within U.S. borders).
234. Norton, supra note 231, at 579 (defining the objective territorial principle as the
jurisdiction based on "an offense commenced outside the [country] but consummated within
its territory.").
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United States; (2) materially affected the foreign trade or commerce
of the United States; and (3) been intended to affect commerce in
the United States.2 85
Since Alcoa, the Effects Doctrine has been used in numerous
cases, but its application has been somewhat varied. 3 6 Shortly after
Alcoa, some courts applied the Effects Doctrine so that a mere finding of actual effects, regardless of their magnitude was adequate to
apply United States antitrust laws extraterritorially 3 7 However, the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law required that the
effect must be substantial.238 Similarly, in extraterritorial application of United States securities law, the Effects Doctrine was used
several times to justify application of the law.23 9
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,2 40 Judge Choy
of the Ninth Circuit provided a new formula for the Effects Doctrine. In addition to requiring intended and substantial effects within
the country exercising jurisdiction, Timberlane held explicitly, for
the first time, that it is necessary to consider the interests of the
other countries involved. 41 Under the Timberlane test, the country
exercising its prescriptive jurisdiction must find (1) an actual or intended effect within its territory; (2) an actual violation of law; and
(3) sufficiently strong linkage with the activity subject to its extrater235. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
236. See Norton, supra note 231, at 580-82, 588-90 (discussing different applications of
the Effects Doctrine).
237. See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
United States v. The Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1965).
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 18 (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. This section provides the general formula of the Effects Doctrine as
follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory,
if ....
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;(iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that
have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id. (emphasis added).
239. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
240. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
241. Id. at 613. Timberlane notes that other courts have also considered the interests of
foreign countries in an implicit manner. Id. at 612.
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ritorial jurisdiction.24 2
The Timberlane approach is reflected in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law by the principle of reasonableness. 243 Rather than setting out the elements of the Effects Doctrine,
as did the Restatement (Second),244 the Restatement (Third) only
242. Id. at 613; see also Norton, supra note 231, at 588. Joseph Norton sets out the
Timberlane test as follows:
(i) Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States?
(ii) Is the alleged restraint of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognisable as a
violation of United States antitrust laws?
(iii) As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States, be asserted to cover it?
Norton, supra note 231, at 588.
243. RESTATEMENT (TiuRD), supra note 22, § 403. This section, entitled "Limitation on
Jurisdiction to Prescribe," provides that:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2);
a state should defer to the other state if the state's interest is clearly greater.

Id.
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 238, § 18. This section is reprinted at supra
note 238.
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provides that "[s]ubject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to . . . conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory. ' 245 The Restatement (Third) then relies on the principle of reasonableness reflected in § 403 to determine the outer limit of United States extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 40
The heart of the Restatement approach is, thus, the balancing
of interests of international comity. The new § 301 must also be examined from that perspective. When there is concurrent jurisdiction
between the United States and the country allegedly engaged in an
unfair trade practice, 4 7 the issue is which country has a stronger
link to and a greater interest in the activity subject to § 301 investigation. If the United States and a sovereign country are economically interdependent, the country's trade is likely to have "effects"
within the United States and these effects may adversely impact certain industries in the United States. However, the effects alone do
not justify the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction under the Restatement approach.248 This is a trade policy concern of a sovereign country 249 or of an international governmental organization. 2 "° Even
under the Effects Doctrine, the United States must exercise its jurisdiction within the limits permitted under international law.
3.

Solutions to Concurrent Jurisdiction

a. Examination of § 301 Under the Restatement Approach.-Under current state law the following test determines
whether extraterritorial assertion of United States jurisdiction is
justified:
(1) Whether there is an actual or intended effect on
American commerce caused by the activity originated in the
251
foreign territory;
245.
246.
247.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 402(1)(c).
See id.
See supra notes 63-102. The countries under § 301 investigation also had at least

as much interest as the United States with respect to the act, policy or practice involved. That
is why most of these countries entered vigorous bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Accord-

ing to the TABLE OF CAsEs, supra note 53, about 50% of the cases involved these types of
negotiations.
248. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
249. See TABLE OF CAsEs, supra note 53 (showing that the subject of § 301 investiga-

tions are sovereign states).
250. Id. (showing that some § 301 investigations are targeted toward the European
Community).
251. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976),
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(2) Whether the effect is substantial within the United
States;252 and
(3) Whether the United States' interests are "sufficiently strong vis-A-vis those of other nations" involved so
that it is reasonable for the United States to assert prescriptive jurisdiction.25 a
Before § 301 will apply, the USTR must find that a foreign
trade practice denies the United States certain rights,2 4 and thus
the section is only applicable if that trade practice has an effect upon
the foreign commerce of the United States. 55 The first element,
therefore, is met under § 301. In addition, the magnitude of the effect within the United States is deemed substantial since the United
States' trade deficit grew to over 150 billion dollars per year in 1987,
the year before the 1988 Trade Act was enacted. 255 Thus, the second
element is met.
The real test, therefore, will focus on the third prong; that is,
whether the interests of the United States are strong enough, vis-Avis those of other nations, so that it is reasonable for the United
States to assert prescriptive jurisdiction. Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law considers eight factors in
determining the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction. 257 The
factors set out in § 403 are by no means exhaustive, 258 nor clear cut;
however, such vagueness reflects the difficulty in determining which
country's trade interests actually override in a situation of concurrent jurisdiction.259 Section 403(2)(a) of the Restatement relies on
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). This is the first prong of the Timberlane test. Id.
252. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. This second prong of the Timberlane test is
formulated so as to question whether the activity is sufficient to invoke the federal statute. Id.
However, in cases questioning whether the United States has power to enact a statute which
purports to regulate a foreign act, policy or practice, the question must be formulated to determine the magnitude of the effect.
253.

Id. The Timberlane court specified that this element is only applicable where the

dispute involves an international setting. Id. This element is always present when determining
the reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See id.
254.

19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1988). This section is reprinted in supra note 107.

255. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 64 (noting the trade surplus and deficit of the United States since
1970). In the case of Super 301, the priority countries and practices are determined according
to the statistical data of the NTE Report. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2420 (1988). The substanti-

ality of the effect is, therefore, guaranteed in statistics.
257. RESTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 22, § 403(2)(a)-(h); see supra note 243. For a
discussion of these factors, see infra notes 258-75 and accompanying text.
258. Id. § 403 comment b.
259. It is the position of some United States courts that international comity is not
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the Timberlane test, examining the linkage between the regulating
state and the extraterritorial activity in terms of the magnitude of
the effect.26 ° Section 403(2)(b) and (c) of the Restatement considers
the extent to which the countries involved have interests in the ques26
tioned activity. '
Section 403(2)(d) considers the "existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation. ' 26 2 Foreign
governments engaged in economic or trade policy do not expect unilateral retaliation by the United States especially where GATT pro23
vides the dispute resolution mechanism.

Section 403(2)(e) and (f) of the Restatement (Third) further
considers the importance and the consistency of the regulation under
an international system.264 The expectation of foreign governments is
further curtailed under the USTR's authority in the new § 301265
The USTR considers the impact of the foreign practice, basing its
decision substantially on the NTE Report as provided in Super
301.266 However, "even though the effect may be substantial in the
U.S., it may be far more substantial abroad. 26 7 Should the USTR
be permitted to act under Super 301, merely because there is a substantial effect within its territory, regardless of the effect of retaliation in the country where Super 301 is invoked?
In "unfair" trade practice cases before GATT, GATT's ability
to make necessary judgments has been questioned. 8 Inevitably, the
alleged "unfair" trade practice will involve "some nontrade reason
for the trade-restricting local regulation. ' 26 9 Although GATT has to
judge whether the nontrade reason is sufficient to justify the alleged
merely a matter of "discretion and courtesy" but reflects a "sense of obligation among states."
Id. § 403 comment a.
260. See id. § 403(2)(a); supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
261. See REsTATEMENT (Tm),supra note 22, § 403(2)(b)-(c); supra note 243.
262. REsTATEMENT (TmwRD), supra note 22, § 403(2)(d); see supra note 243.
263. See supra notes 154-85 and aedompanying text (discussing the GATT dispute resolution mechanism and cases which utilized such a procedure).
264. See RESTATEMENT (TmRw), supra note 22, § 403(2)(e)-(0; supra note 243.
265. A country does not have enforcement jurisdiction when it lacks prescriptive jurisdiction, Bowett, supra note 20, at 1, but the enforcement aspect of the new § 301 makes it
more difficult to justify the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States.
266. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988) (setting forth the scope of the USTR's authority
to take action); id. § 2420 (requiring the USTR to take into account the NTE Report which
must be made each year pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2241 (1988)).
267. Bowett, supra note 20, at 20.
268. See Hudec, supra note 121, at 502.
269. Id.
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practice,270 "GATT cannot second-guess national governments unless the community feels strongly that its judgment is legitimate."127 '
Despite these shortcomings, there is no guarantee that the USTR's
ability to evaluate another state's governmental policy is any better
than GATT's ability. However, GATT compensates for its weaknesses by strongly encouraging parties to settle their disputes
through direct consultation, rather than by GATT panel recommendation. 2 This explains why, until 1985, the President was reluctant
to act under § 301. He preferred that decisions be made from a
broader perspective which evaluated the overall impact of the § 301
action. 3 Super 301 took this discretion away from the USTR, and
thereby made it more difficult to justify jurisdiction based on the
Effects Doctrine. Furthermore, § 301 imposes unilateral retaliation
by the United States without balancing the competing interests as
required under § 403 of the Restatement (Third).
Section 403(2)(g) and (h) considers the extent of another country's interest. 4 Section 301 attempts to regulate the foreign "act,
policy or practice" itself. 275 It is arguable that the foreign government's interest in its own act, policy or practice cannot be less than
the interest of the United States despite the effect within the United
States. Considering all of the factors enumerated in § 403 of the
Restatement (Third), it is reasonable to conclude that the interests
of foreign governments exceed those of the United States even
though the United States has justifiable interests in the matter.
When more than one country has a reasonable basis of jurisdiction, § 403(3) of the Restatement (Third) provides that a "state
should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
greater." 27 6 Therefore, in a situation where an unfair trade practice
involves a foreign government's act, policy or practice, the United
States should defer to the other state because the statute directly
challenges the other state's foreign policy. The United States is not
left without a remedy when it defers to the foreign government because the GATT system provides the alternative dispute settlement
277
mechanism with which the other government should comply.
270.

See GATT, supra note 19, art. XXIII, at 55-57; supra note 165.

271. Hudec, supra note 121, at 502.
272. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
274.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 403(2)(g)-(h); supra note 243.

275. 19 U.S.C § 2411 (1988).
276. RESTATEMENT (TrmR), supra note 22, § 403(3); supra note 243.
277. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
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Based upon these considerations, § 301 cannot be justified because
the United States lacks legitimate prescriptive jurisdiction.
b. The Limitation of the Balancing Interest Approach Under
the Restatement.- Section 301 cannot be justified under the rule of
reasonableness adopted by the Restatement, which relied on the
Timberlane decision. 7 Foreign countries criticize this approach,
which requires self-restraint in the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, because it merely proves the lack of international standards
regulating such jurisdiction. 7 These critics point out that it is inherently difficult for a forum state to balance the interests of countries
which assert concurrent jurisdiction.2 80 Professor Bowett suggests
2 l
that the balancing of interests cannot be achieved by legislation;
instead, it must be achieved by either judicial intervention or
through negotiations. In the case of trade disputes, which are often
very political, 8 2 problems should be solved through negotiations as
provided for in GATT. ssa Instead of exercising unilateral jurisdiction
under § 301, the United States should resort to the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism. For all of the foregoing reasons, § 301 should
be repealed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Super 301 presents numerous problems under international law,284 Congress has consistently expressed its willingness to
impose "a credible threat of retaliation whenever a foreign nation
treats the commerce of the United States unfairly ... whether or not
such action would be entirely consistent with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. '285 However, since the United States is bound
by the rules of international law, 286 the integrity of its legal system is
undermined by enacting a statute which clearly violates the princi278. See supra notes 240-76 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Bowett, supra note 20, at 21; S. YAMAMOTO,
TIONAL LAW] 206-07 (1985).

KOKUSAI-Ho [INTERNA-

280. See Bowett, supra note 20, at 20-25.
281. Id. at 25.
282. See generally Eichmann & Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade:
Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989) (concluding that judicial
review of § 301 actions is a distinct possibility).
283. Bowett, supra note 20, at 25.
284. See supra notes 140-283 and accompanying text.
285. S. REP.No. 93, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 163, 164-65, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7301, 7303-04.
286. See supra notes 186-206, 220-23 and accompanying text.
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pies of GATT.287 This is especially true where the United States
lacks jurisdiction to prescribe.2 s8 Super 301 should, therefore, be repealed 289 and the United States government should concentrate its
efforts on both bilateral and multilateral negotiation in order to solve
trade disputes.
Fusae Nara

287. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 224-25, 247-77 and accompanying text.
289. The original mechanism of § 301 may remain to the extent that it allows the U.S.
Government to collect information from private industries which indicates where the government should focus its trade negotiation efforts. See Comment, supra note 153, at 499 n.50.
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